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 Introduction/Abstract 
 Since the late seventies, the main research program for understanding 
 intentionality has been based on the attempt to naturalize intentionality by 
identifying a natural relation that holds between internal states of the brain and 
external states of the world when and only when the former represent the latter. 
Call this the  Naturalist-Externalist Research Program , or NERP. Diff erent versions 
of NERP diff er on how they construe the relevant natural relation. Typically, it 
is construed as involving in its core a type of tracking relation, whereby internal 
states occur sensitively to the presence of specifi c external conditions. 1 
 Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire 
approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness 
has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role it is not 
accorded in NERP. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the 
fore the notion of  phenomenal intentionality , as well as a cluster of nearby 
notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complemen-
tary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research 
program—what I call the  Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program , 
or PIRP. 
 My principal goals in this chapter are the following. First, I will explicitly 
articulate, and elaborate upon, what I take to be the fundamental claims at 
the heart of this nascent research program. Secondly, I will review some of the 
arguments in the recent philosophical literature that support key theses of 
PIRP, in the process illustrating some apparent advantages of the framework 
in comparison to NERP. " irdly, I will point out some important theoretical 
options within the generic PIRP framework, specifying issues about which pro-
ponents of the general framework might disagree. 
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 1.  An Overview of PIRP 
 Phenomenal intentionality is the intentionality a mental state exhibits purely 
in virtue of its phenomenal character. As far as I know, the term makes its fi rst 
appearance in two papers circulating in the second half of the nineties, Brian 
Loar’s (2003) “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content” and 
Terry Horgan and John Tienson’s (2002) “" e Phenomenology of Intentionality 
and the Intentionality of Phenomenology.” Loar’s paper started circulating in the 
late nineties, however, and in any case the  idea of phenomenal intentionality is 
present in Loar’s work much earlier. His 1987 paper “Subjective Intentionality” 
may be regarded as the fi rst explicit published discussion of phenomenal inten-
tionality in analytic Anglo-American philosophy. Arguably, however, the lively 
debates on intentionality among Brentano and his students (see Brentano 1874, 
Twardowski 1895, Husserl 1901, and Meinong 1904) in fact concerned phenome-
nal intentionality, which was probably the only intentionality they recognized. 2 
 1.1.  Toward a New Research Program 
 " e term “research program” can be used to intimate two diff erent things. In 
one sense, the term is used to refer to a degraded kind of theory—a cluster of 
ideas whose purpose is to  become a comprehensive theory of some phenomenon 
but which has not yet reached the maturity and cohesion required. In another 
sense, the term is used to denote a perfectly clear general  framework for the 
study of some phenomenon, a framework within which several distinct theo-
ries could be pursued that share a fundamental commonality (a “paradigm” 
perhaps). My claim here is that work on phenomenal intentionality is on the 
cusp of qualifying as a research program in the second. 
 Compare NERP, where a number of distinct theories can be discerned—infor-
mational semantics, functional role semantics, teleosemantics—that nonetheless 
share the general idea that some kind of naturalistically kosher relation between 
brain events and world events must underlie intentionality. Put impressionisti-
cally, the basic idea shared by all theories within NERP is that intentionality is 
injected into the world with the appearance in nature of a certain kind of tracking 
relation. It is when the relevant tracking relation occurs between distinct states 
(including brain states and environmental states) in the world that intentional-
ity makes its fi rst appearance on the scene. Once intentionality has thus been 
injected into the world, it can start being “passed around” so it is somewhat “freed 
from” the relevant tracking relation. Linguistic expressions, paintings, and traffi  c 
signs, for example, may represent even in the absence of tracking, because they 
somehow derive their intentionality from things that do track. But the  source of 
all intentionality is the relevant kind of tracking relation. Something like this is 
the paradigm that guides work on intentionality within NERP. 
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 " e basic, guiding idea of PIRP could be thought of on the same model 
(Kriegel 2011). " e cornerstone would be the idea that intentionality is injected 
into the world with the appearance of a certain kind of phenomenal character. 
It is when the relevant phenomenal character shows up that intentionality 
makes its fi rst appearance on the scene. Here too, once this phenomenal char-
acter appears, and brings in its train “original intentionality,” intentionality 
can be “passed around” to things lacking this (or any) phenomenal character. 
But the source of all intentionality is the relevant phenomenal character. 
 Within NERP, diff erent comprehensive theories of intentionality may dif-
fer along two central dimensions. First, they may diff er on what they identify 
as the relevant tracking relation that brings intentionality into the world. Is 
it a causal relation, an informational relation, a counterfactual-dependence 
relation, a teleological relation? Much of the debate on intentionality during 
the eighties concerned this question. Secondly, they may diff er on how they 
choose to account for derived intentionality, in language and other forms of 
tracking-free intentionality. 3 " e leading account here is probably Grice’s (1957, 
1969) intention-based theory (see also Schiff er 1982), which is most naturally 
applied to language, but may also be extended to pictorial representation (Abell 
2005, Blumson 2006) and perhaps other forms of derived intentionality. One 
may say, then, that comprehensive theories of intentionality within NERP are 
composed of two chapters, namely, (i) an account of the relevant tracking rela-
tion and (ii) an account of the derivation relation (in the relevant sense). 4 
 More generally, the two chapters concern  source intentionality (if you will) 
and  non-source intentionality. " is general structure can be reproduced for 
PIRP. " is would be to think of a comprehensive theory of intentionality as 
involving the following two chapters: (i) an account of the kind of phenomenal 
character that constitutes source intentionality and (ii) an account of the deri-
vation relation that underlies non-source intentionality. Accordingly, diff erent 
theories of intentionality within PIRP would diff er in the kind of phenomenal 
character they identify as the source of all intentionality and/or in how they 
choose to account for phenomenality-free intentionality (in language, pictures, 
unconscious mentation, etc.). 5 
 In the remainder of this section, I off er a fi rst pass at understanding PIRP—
what it attempts to do (§1.2) and how it attempts to do it (§1.3). Later, I will 
review some of the main ideas surrounding the notion of phenomenal inten-
tionality (§2), then outline the structure of a general theory of intentionality 
within PIRP (§3). 
 1.2.  Location Projects and the * eory of Intentionality 
 Jackson (1998) usefully describes the core of what he calls  “serious  metaphysics” 
as the project of addressing the “location problem”: the problem of fi nding a place 
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for some phenomenon (typically familiar from the manifest image) in descrip-
tion of the world cast entirely in some privileged vocabulary. In fact, however, 
there appear to be two kinds of location problem one might distinguish. I will 
call these  naturalistic location and  foundational location (respectively). 6 
 Roughly and generically, naturalistic location of a puzzling phenomenon 
(e.g., intentionality) is a matter of identifying it with some phenomenon also 
describable in such a way that the phenomenon, as thus alternatively described, 
counts as “non-mysterious” and “kosher” within a metaphysical perspective 
that gives pride of place to natural science. In the case of naturalizing inten-
tionality, the project is to locate intentionality in a world fully described by the 
natural sciences. To do so is to “naturalistically locate” intentionality. 
 Naturalistic location thus involves taking the vocabulary of the natural sci-
ences to be the privileged vocabulary in serious metaphysics. Foundational 
location, on the other hand, involves taking some other vocabulary, considered 
in some sense foundational, to be privileged. In the case of intentionality, for 
example, foundational location is, roughly, a matter of (i) identifying the fun-
damental source(s) of intentionality in the world (the way it gets “injected” into 
the world), and (ii) identifying the principal way(s) derivative kinds of inten-
tionality arise from it. 
 Within NERP, the two kinds of location project—foundational and 
 naturalizing—are eff ectively pursued in tandem. Proposed “sources” are 
naturalistically respectable phenomena (causal, covariational, informational, 
or teleological relations); and their spread to non-source intentionality is 
construed as naturalistically respectable as well. Part of the philosophical 
motivation for proposing such sources is the desire to foundationally locate 
intentionality in a manner that also constitutes  naturalistic location of these 
phenomena. 
 Within PIRP, things proceed diff erently. Pride of place is given to the idea 
that phenomenal consciousness is implicated in the source of intentionality—
it somehow founds, or grounds, all intentionality. 7 Naturalization, if it is to 
come at all, needs to be a naturalized version of PIRP (“NPIRP,” if you will). 
 1.3.  Fundamental Tenets of PIRP 
 As noted earlier, work on phenomenal intentionality already qualifi es as a 
research program in the looser sense, since many interrelated theses recur 
in discussions of the notion. I now propose, in rough and generic terms, an 
explicit articulation of the common basic ideas that are implicit in this work on 
phenomenal intentionality. " e six theses below will be put somewhat vaguely, 
in order to be suitably generic. 8 It would be too much to expect that all philoso-
phers who qualify as pursuing PIRP subscribe to all six theses. But my sugges-
tion is more modest: that (a) most would subscribe to all six theses and (b) all 
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would subscribe to most theses. 9 I fi rst present the six theses, then off er some 
initial clarifi cation of each. 
 Phenomenal Grounding . " ere is a kind of intentionality—phenomenal inten-
tionality—that is grounded in phenomenal character. 
 Inseparatism . " e phenomenal and the intentional do not form two separate 
mental realms, but are instead inseparably intertwined. 
 Distinctiveness . Phenomenal intentionality is special and distinctive, in that 
it has certain important properties that non-phenomenal forms of inten-
tionality do not. 
 Narrowness . Phenomenal intentionality is narrow, that is, it is not constitu-
tively dependent upon anything outside the experiencing subject. 
 Subjectivity . Phenomenal intentionality is inherently subjective: it is built 
into the phenomenal character of a phenomenally intentional state that 
it (re)presents what it does  to someone . 
 Basicness . Phenomenal intentionality is a basic kind of intentionality and 
functions as a source of all intentionality. 
 Some initial clarifi cations are in order. Regarding  Phenomenal Grounding , 
what the pertinent kind of grounding comes to, metaphysically, is a mat-
ter about which diff erent PIRPers could go diff erent ways. One clarifi cation 
is essential though: somewhat atypically, as I use the term “grounding,” the 
grounding relation need not be anti-symmetric. On the contrary, it could well 
be that the phenomenal property and the intentional property it grounds are 
strictly  identical . (More on that in 1.4.) 
 As for  Inseparatism , a traditional picture divided the mind into two separate 
realms: sensory states, which are essentially phenomenal but non-intentional, 
and cognitive states, which are essentially intentional but non-phenomenal 
(Horgan and Tienson 2002). " is is what  Inseparatism rejects, holding instead 
(i) that paradigmatic sensory states in fact exhibit intentionality, which is 
moreover grounded by their phenomenality, and (ii) that paradigmatic cog-
nitive states in fact boast a phenomenality, which moreover grounds their 
intentionality. 
 Next consider  Distinctiveness . " is is the idea that there is something special 
about phenomenal intentionality that sets it apart from other kinds of inten-
tionality. Phenomenal intentionality has certain signifi cant peculiarities. Part 
of the reason the notion of phenomenal intentionality becomes the focus of 
dedicated research is precisely this distinctiveness. 
 Concerning  Narrowness , now, an intentional property is narrow just in case 
it supervenes on the subject’s non-relational properties, that is, is “locally 
supervenient.” " us to say that phenomenal-intentional properties are narrow 
is to say that they are locally supervenient. 
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 As for  Subjectivity , I note that recent philosophical work on phenomenal 
consciousness has increasingly emphasized the fact that phenomenal charac-
ter has to do not just what it is like but with what it is like  for the subject . " is 
feature is inherited by phenomenal intentionality: a phenomenally intentional 
state presents what it does  to the subject . (More on this in 2.3.) 
 Finally,  Basicness is essentially the thesis that all intentionality derives from 
phenomenal intentionality. It appears to follow from this that in the absence of 
phenomenal intentionality there would be no intentionality at all. Clearly, this 
is a linchpin thesis for the foundational location project. 
 1.4.  Some * eoretical Options within PIRP 
 " ere are a number of important issues about which proponents of the generic 
PIRP framework could take diff erent positions. Here I will briefl y describe some 
of these issues and some principal theoretical options concerning them. 10 
 First is the relation between phenomenal properties and fundamental inten-
tional properties. One view is that the “relation” is outright identity: the inten-
tional property  just is the phenomenal property. An alternative view is that 
phenomenal properties are distinct from the relevant intentional properties, 
that the intentional properties supervene with metaphysical necessity upon 
the phenomenal properties, and/or that the intentional properties are realized 
by the phenomenal properties. A third option is that there is an anti-symmetric 
relation of metaphysical dependence that the intentional properties bear to the 
phenomenal properties and that goes beyond mere supervenience—a sort of 
“in virtue of” relation. " ere may be other options as well. 
 Second is the  extent of phenomenal intentionality. One view is that 
 phenomenal intentionality is confi ned to perceptual experience, or to this plus 
somatic and emotional experience. Another view is that it is much more perva-
sive, including for instance the phenomenology of agency, the phenomenology 
of thought (so-called cognitive phenomenology), and so on. 11 Embracing the 
leaner view presumably would greatly complicate the task of making a case for 
 Basicness ; the wider the extent of phenomenal intentionality, the more ten-
able  Basicness is. However, there is nothing incoherent about pursuing PIRP 
while rejecting an expansive account of phenomenology. One could perfectly 
well hold that all phenomenology is sensory and nonetheless subscribe to all 
six theses listed earlier. " is is important, because some commentators discuss 
the notion of phenomenal intentionality as though it is defi nitionally tied to 
the possibility of cognitive phenomenology (e.g., Lycan 2008). 
 " ird is the question of whether (some or all) phenomenally intentional 
states exhibit any kind of non-foundational, merely derived intentionality 
along with their underived source intentionality. One view is that some or all 
do, one that none do. 
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 Fourth is the question of whether phenomenal intentionality is in fact 
naturalistically, or even physicalistically, locatable. One view is that it is, 
even though the relevant kind of naturalization evidently would need to look 
rather diff erent from NERP. " e opposite view is that phenomenal-intentional 
properties are primitive and irreducible (or at least not reducible to physical 
properties). 12 
 2.  Arguments for Central PIRP * eses 
 In this section, I survey various arguments from the recent philosophical lit-
erature pertaining to the existence of phenomenal intentionality, its scope and 
extent in human mentality, its distinctive features, and its basic role as the 
source of all intentionality. 
 2.1.  * e Existence of Phenomenal Intentionality 
 Why think that there is such a thing as phenomenally grounded intentional-
ity? One consideration unlikely to win converts but central in motivating sym-
pathizers is the idea that phenomenal intentionality is simply  introspectively 
manifest : attending to one’s stream of consciousness in the right way brings 
out that some conscious episodes are intentional, and intentional because phe-
nomenal. Certainly introspection suggests that some mental states have both 
intentionality and phenomenality. Whether introspection reveals that some-
times the former is grounded in the latter is a harder question. Admittedly, it 
is implausible that introspection presents any grounding relation  as a ground-
ing relation. But it is much more plausible that introspection presents what 
is in fact a grounding relation under a simpler guise, but in such a way that a 
suffi  ciently sophisticated theoretician could justifi ably conceptualize what is 
presented as grounding. 13 
 An argument with a more neutral starting point is due to Charles Siewert 
(1998). He notes that, purely in virtue of their phenomenal character (and 
without need of interpretation), conscious experiences are often assessable 
for accuracy. Suppose you undergo an experience with a squarish phenome-
nal character. If nothing around you is square, your experience is assessable 
as inaccurate. If the right object or surface  is square, your experience may be 
assessable as accurate. " us phenomenal character can bring in its train accu-
racy conditions. Since having accuracy conditions is an intentional property, 
it appears that at least some phenomenal character can guarantee intentional 
properties. 
 Finally, the existence of phenomenal intentionality may be supported with 
thought experiments. For instance, we can conceive of a disembodied soul in 
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an otherwise empty world who is phenomenally indistinguishable from us 
(Kriegel Ms). Intuitively, portions of the soul’s inner life are also  intentionally 
indistinguishable (in the sense of instantiating the same intentional prop-
erties) from corresponding portions of our own inner life—we and the soul 
will have some intentional states in common. " e fact that some phenomenal 
duplication secures intentional duplication suggests (perhaps entails) that 
some phenomenal properties are suffi  cient for intentional properties. Another 
thought experiment is the more familiar brain-in-vat one (Horgan et al. 2004). 
Intuitively, an envatted brain that is physically identical throughout its exis-
tence to your brain, with identical sensory inputs all the while, would have a 
conscious mental life that intentionally matches yours exactly. And intuitively, 
the basis for this intentional match would be that this envatted brain would 
have a mental life some of which is  phenomenally exactly like yours. 
 2.2.  * e Scope of Phenomenal Intentionality 
 Once one knows that there is phenomenal intentionality in the world, one 
wants to know just  how much of it there is. Much of the work carried out by 
PIRPers concerns this question. 
 " e question may be profi tably divided into two sub-questions, concern-
ing (respectively) sensory and non-sensory phenomenal intentionality. " e 
challenge presented by each question has been quite diff erent. In the sensory 
domain, it is widely acknowledged that there is sensory phenomenology; the 
challenge has been to show that there is a sensory intentionality it grounds. In 
the non-sensory domain, it is widely acknowledged that there is non-sensory 
intentionality; the challenge has been to show that there is a non-sensory phe-
nomenology that grounds it. In this section, I review some work on  non-sensory 
phenomenal intentionality. 14 " is work has tended to fall in turn into two 
categories, concerned with phenomenal intentionality  within and  without the 
sphere of perceptual experience. 
 Within the perceptual sphere, there are elements in perceptual experience 
that are intentionally rich but are claimed to nonetheless involve phenomenal 
intentionality. Perhaps the most systematic contribution to the study of per-
ceptual phenomenal intentionality is due to Susanna Siegel (2005, 2006a), who 
argues that high-level properties are represented in perception. " ese include 
causation, meaning, and kind properties. " e idea is that we not only  under-
stand , but can also  perceive , that one billiard ball causes the motion of another; 
that some words on a page mean that the basketball game has been canceled; 
that something colorful and shapely is a parrot (see also Siewert 1998). 
 A particularly intriguing debate in this area concerns the point at which 
perceptual experiences start presenting us with an objective world, a world 
whose character is independent of the subject’s perceptual activity. Siegel 
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(2006b) herself argues that this occurs when part of the content of a  perceptual 
experience is that its object will not move if the subject changes her spatial 
perspective on it. Farid Masrour (2008) argues that this occurs rather when 
the experience acquires a certain phenomenal feature he calls “dynamic unity 
structure.” 15 Other views are also possible. 
 A related and quite central debate concerns the representation of perspectival 
properties. Suppose you look at a tilted coin. Does your perceptual experience 
present the coin as (having the non-perspectival property of being) circular or 
as (having the perspectival property of being) elliptical? Kelly (2004) argues 
that only the (non-perspectival) circularity is presented in experience, whereas 
No ë (2004) claims that both the (non-perspectival) circularity and (perspec-
tival) ellipticality are presented. 
 For a variety of reasons, friends of phenomenal intentionality have often 
been keen to argue for the existence of non-perceptual experience with a purely 
intellectual or cognitive phenomenology that constitutes its intentionality. 
Perhaps the strongest thesis in this vein is Pitt’s (2004) claim that thoughts 
have a phenomenology which is both  proprietary and  individuative , that is, a 
phenomenology that both is diff erent from all other types of phenomenology 
and varies whenever the content varies. 16 
 " e literature contains two main types of argument for claims of this sort 
(though there are at least three more minor types of argument I will not survey 
here). One is an argument from phenomenal contrast: two conscious episodes 
are contrasted, where (i) there is clearly an overall diff erence in what it is like 
to undergo these episodes and (ii) the best account of that diff erence is in terms 
of a diff erence in a purely cognitive phenomenal character. A much discussed 
argument of this form is due to Strawson (1994), though it is present in essence 
already in Moore (1953). Strawson argues for the existence of “understanding 
experience” by contrasting the overall phenomenologies of a French speaker 
and a non–French speaker listening to the news in French. Strawson claims 
that there is a diff erence in what it is like for them to listen to the news, and 
that the diff erence is best accounted for in terms of an element of understand-
ing experience present only in the French speaker’s phenomenology. 17 
 " e second kind of argument appeals to an asymmetric access one has to 
one’s conscious cognitive states and their contents (Goldman 1993, Pitt 2004). 
Schematically, the argument proceeds as follows: one has a special, immediate 
access to some of one’s cognitive states (and their contents); only to phenom-
enal states (and contents) can one have this kind of special access; therefore, 
(some of) one’s cognitive states (and their contents) are phenomenal. 
 " is is a very partial survey of research in this area. " e  telos of this research 
appears to be to establish that sensory states’ phenomenology is inherently 
intentional and that non-sensory states’ intentionality is phenomenally 
grounded. If something like this is established, then the separatist picture 
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of the mind collapses, and a more unifi ed picture emerges that conforms to 
 Inseparatism (see §1.3). One way to develop the inseparatist picture is to con-
strue the concept of mind as a prototype concept, such that a state or event 
qualifi es as mental to the extent that it is appropriately related to prototypical 
mental states, but where all (and perhaps only) prototypical mental states are 
phenomenally intentional states (Horgan and Kriegel 2008). 
 2.3.  * e Distinctiveness of Phenomenal Intentionality 
 Another focal point of much work on phenomenal intentionality is the thought 
that there is something special about phenomenal intentionality—that phe-
nomenal intentionality exhibits signifi cant distinctive features absent in other 
types of intentionality. " is is important, because if phenomenal intention-
ality is indeed distinctive, it may resist theoretical treatment perfectly suit-
able for other types of intentionality. For example, one might hold that while 
teleosemantics is the true theory of  non-phenomenal intentionality, some other 
theory would be needed to accommodate the distinctive features of  phenomenal 
intentionality. 
 One recurrent distinctiveness claim is that only phenomenal intentionality 
has  determinate content in and of itself (Searle 1991, 1992, Loar 1995, Horgan 
and Tienson 2002, Strawson 2008, Horgan and Graham forthcoming). We may 
state this thesis as follows:
 Determinate Content . Necessarily, for any intentional state M with con-
tent C, if C is non-derivatively determinate, then M is phenomenally 
intentional. 
 On this view, non-phenomenally intentional states can have determinate con-
tent, but not  in and of themselves . Instead, they must  derive their determinate 
content from phenomenally intentional states they are appropriately related 
to. By “determinate content,” I simply mean content which is as fi ne-grained 
as one’s intentional contents appear pre-theoretically to be. For example, 
pre-theoretically it seems that one’s thoughts are fi ne-grained enough to be 
about rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts, about Phosphorus rather 
than Hesperus, about triangles rather than closed trilateral fi gures, and so 
on. If a kind of intentional state is  not this fi ne-grained, I say that its content 
is indeterminate. And if it  is this fi ne-grained, but not intrinsically so, I say 
that its content is only derivatively determinate.  Determinate Content claims 
that only phenomenally intentional states have non-derivatively determinate 
content. 18 
 One key argument for this thesis, in very rough outline, is that noth-
ing other than phenomenal character can secure content determinacy. 
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In particular, tracking relations cannot account for this determinacy—not 
even when teleologically augmented. Whenever an internal state bears track-
ing relations to rabbits or Phosphorus, it also bears them to undetached rab-
bit parts or Hesperus. And as Fodor (1984, 1990) argued long ago, whenever 
tracking a property F is adaptive for an organism, it is also and equally adaptive 
for it to track any property coextensive with F. Evolutionary benefi t cannot 
discriminate between coextensive properties (let alone necessarily coextensive 
ones). Of course, for all I just said, there may be some other non-phenomenal 
feature that can secure content determinacy, but proponents of  Determinate 
Content have attempted to consider all the initially plausible candidates and 
argue against them (see especially Horgan and Graham forthcoming). 
 Another claim with the same general structure is that only phenomenal 
intentionality is  intrinsically subjective (McGinn 1988, Kriegel 2003b, Georgalis 
2006). Put in McGinn’s (1988) terms, the basic idea is that conscious content 
is Janus-faced, in that in addition to its outward-looking face of presenting 
some object or state of aff airs in the world, it also possesses an inward-looking 
face involving an elusive  presence to the subject . " is can perhaps be interpreted 
more rigorously as the thesis that while unconscious intentional states instan-
tiate in and of themselves only the two-place relation  x represents y , conscious 
ones instantiate the three-place relation  x represents y to z . Let us say that an 
intentional state M is  non-derivatively subjective just in case it instantiates the 
three-place representation relation intrinsically, that is, in and of itself. 19 " en 
we may put the thesis as follows:
 Intrinsic Subjectivity. Necessarily, for any intentional state M, if M is 
non-derivatively subjective, then M is phenomenally intentional. 
 " e thesis allows unconscious intentional states to instantiate the three-place 
representation relation, but not intrinsically. Rings on a tree trunk can repre-
sent the tree’s age  to a botanist , and an unconscious state in the dorsal stream 
of the visual system can represent a circle  to a neuroscientist . But in these cases, 
the representation-to is not inherent in the representation-of. Rather, the 
representation of a worldly feature represents what it does  to someone simply 
because someone harbors a  separate representation of it; it is only thanks to 
this other (second-order) representation that the original (fi rst-order) repre-
sentation represents  to someone . Phenomenally intentional states, by contrast, 
are non-derivatively subjective in that they represent what they do  to someone 
without requiring that “someone” to harbor a numerically distinct representa-
tion of them. 
 It is not easy to discern in the existing literature a clear  argument for  Intrinsic 
Subjectivity . " is is probably because the pull of the thesis is mostly phenom-
enological. It has sometimes been claimed, on broadly phenomenological 
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grounds, that all conscious states necessarily involve a kind of for-me-ness, or 
subjective signifi cance, whereby their subject is aware of them in an immedi-
ate and somewhat elusive manner (Levine 2001, Kriegel 2005, 2009, Horgan 
et al. 2006). It is natural to think that when an  intentional state is conscious, 
its for-me-ness will manifest itself as the kind of non-derivative subjectivity 
under discussion. 
 Here too it is clear that the intrinsic subjectivity of phenomenally intentional 
states creates a prima facie problem for NERP, as the latter is geared to account 
mostly for representation-of, not representation-to. Perhaps one exception is 
Millikan’s (1989) consumer semantics, which may be naturally thought of as 
capable of accounting for representation-to. In consumer semantics, the con-
tent of a representation R is determined not by the way the system that  produces 
R tracks conditions in the world, but by the way the downstream systems that 
 consume R track them. In a way, we may say that it is what R represents  to the 
consumer systems that determines R’s content. " us consumer semantics off ers 
a NERP-y gloss on representation-to. However, it is unclear that this type of 
representation-to is the one referred to by proponents of  Intrinsic Subjectivity . 
For starters, the latter is always and necessarily a personal-level phenomenon, 
whereas the former can be a sub-personal phenomenon. Likewise, since the 
latter is a phenomenal element and the former is a matter of accessibility or 
consumability, it would appear that the latter is an occurrent property whereas 
the former is a dispositional one. Fuller discussion of these issues cannot be 
attempted in this review, but clearly there are some principled obstacles in the 
way of a consumer-semantic account of representation-to. 20 
 A third distinctiveness claim that shows up often in the relevant literature 
is that phenomenal intentionality always involves  narrow content, in the sense 
of being shared by intrinsic duplicates, whereas non-phenomenal intentional-
ity often involves  wide content (Loar 2003, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan 
et al. 2004, Georgalis 2006, Kriegel 2007, 2011). 21 If a kind of content internal-
ism were generally true of phenomenal intentionality, while content externalism 
were commonly true of non-phenomenal intentionality, that would constitute 
another distinction of phenomenal intentionality. Any distinctiveness the-
sis based on narrowness, however, would have to stress a quantifi cational diff er-
ence only: phenomenal intentionality is always narrow, whereas non-phenomenal 
 intentionality is only sometimes narrow. For it is clear that non-phenomenal 
intentionality can be and often is narrow as well. For some non-phenomenal repre-
sentations represent non-Twin-Earthable properties. For example, an unconscious 
representation of a chair is arguably shared by  intrinsic duplicates, since arguably 
there are no Twin-Earth scenarios in which something looks superfi cially like a 
chair but lacks some chairly underlying nature. 
 Arguments for internalism about phenomenal intentionality vary depend-
ing on the strength and nature of the internalism. But the basic argument for 
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the narrowness of phenomenal intentionality is fairly straightforward (Horgan 
et al. 2004): phenomenal intentionality supervenes on phenomenal character; 
phenomenal character is locally supervenient; therefore, phenomenal inten-
tionality is locally supervenient. " e fi rst premise is more or less defi nitional, 
the second is supported by brain-in-vat thought experiments (involving phe-
nomenal duplicates that lack the relevant relations to the environment), and 
the inference is buttressed by the transitivity of supervenience. 
 Content determinacy, intrinsic subjectivity, and narrowness are recurring 
central claims among philosophers working on phenomenal intentionality. 
" ere are other, more idiosyncratic claims that can and have been made, but 
which will not be discussed here. 
 2.4.  * e Basicness of Phenomenal Intentionality 
 Perhaps the most important kind of claim made on behalf of phenomenal inten-
tionality is that it is in some way  basic among forms of intentionality (e.g., as in 
§1.2). In this section, I review fi rst the main theses alleging basicness, then the 
kinds of argument that have been off ered in their favor. 
 " e strongest possible basicness thesis is that, in reality, there is no inten-
tionality but phenomenal intentionality—all intentionality is phenomenal 
(Strawson 2008, Georgalis 2006). 22 On this view, it is simply false that there is any 
non-phenomenal intentionality. " ere may well be a variety of information-bearing 
states, but for one reason or another those do not qualify as intentional states. " e 
only states that qualify as intentional are phenomenal ones. 
 A more lenient view allows for some non-phenomenal intentionality but 
claims that any such must derive from phenomenal intentionality (McGinn 1988, 
Kriegel 2003b, 2007, 2011). " e distinction between derived and underived inten-
tionality was brought into modern discussions of intentionality by Grice (1957), 
who suggested that the intentionality of language derived from the intentional-
ity of thought: the linguistic symbol c^a^t represents cats only in virtue of bear-
ing a certain relation to cat thoughts, whereas cat thoughts have cat-representing 
content in and of themselves. More generally, it has often been suggested that 
all non-mental intentionality derives from mental intentionality (see Cummins 
1979, Searle 1983, Dretske 1988). But proponents of phenomenal intentionality, 
while embracing the distinction between derived and underived intentionality, 
have sometimes sought to draw it more restrictively, claiming that the intention-
ality of non-phenomenal mental states derives from that of phenomenal ones. 
" us non-phenomenal mental states and non-mental items may be intentional, 
but they must derive their intentionality from phenomenally intentional states. 
 A slightly weaker thesis that might easily be confused with this holds 
that phenomenal intentionality is the only underived intentionality, and 
all non-phenomenal intentionality is derived, but does  not claim that 
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non-phenomenal intentional states (and items) derive their intentional-
ity  from phenomenal-intentional states (Bourget 2010). Instead, it allows 
non-phenomenal states to derive their intentionality  from each other , in con-
trast to phenomenal-intentional states, each of which has its intentionality 
independently of other intentional states. 
 A signifi cantly weaker claim allows non-phenomenal states to boast 
underived intentionality but requires that such states be  potentially 
phenomenal-intentional (Searle 1991, 1992). In other words, only states that 
could potentially have phenomenal intentionality have underived intentional-
ity. Presumably, these states have their intentionality precisely  because they 
could potentially become phenomenal-intentional. " us, a tacit and uncon-
scious belief that 13.46>8.27 is endowed with underived intentionality, but 
only because it  could be conscious. Indeed, its intentional content is partly 
determined by the phenomenal character it  would have if it  were conscious. 
 A thesis weaker yet would require non-phenomenal states to bear some rela-
tion to phenomenal states in order to qualify as non-derivatively intentional, 
but not necessarily the relation of “potentially becoming” (or “potentially 
being”). Instead, it would allow various inferential and/or causal relations to 
experiential states to suffi  ce for derived intentionality (Horgan and Tienson 
2002, Horgan and Graham forthcoming, Loar 2003). As Davies (1995) notes, 
some sub-personal states, such as Marr’s (1982) 2.5D sketches, are naturally 
construed as non-derivatively intentional but are not even potentially con-
scious by any intuitive construal of “potentially.” However, even such states are 
cognitively integrated into a system of inferentially interrelated intentional 
states some of which are phenomenally conscious. It may therefore be sug-
gested that being thus integrated is a necessary condition on a mental state’s 
being non-derivatively intentional. On this view, a mental state qualifi es as 
intentional only if it is related to phenomenally conscious states by the relation 
of being integrated into a single inferential web. 23 
 In sum, there are four main grades of basicness claims discernible in the 
existing literature:
 (B1) All intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. (Strawson, Georgalis) 
 (B2) All intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality. (McGinn, 
Kriegel) 
 (B3) All intentionality derives from potentially phenomenal intentionality. 
(Searle) 
 (B4) All intentionality derives from intentionality appropriately related to 
phenomenal intentionality. (Horgan et al., Loar) 
 Although the theses are diff erent, the arguments adduced in their favor are 
often neutral between them and can be wielded in defense of several or any. 
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I end this section with a review of the main arguments to be found in the lit-
erature. In the present context, I am not endorsing any of them; my purpose is 
merely expository. 
 Most of these arguments follow a similar schema (Kriegel 2003b). First, 
an asymmetry is established between phenomenal and non-phenomenal 
intentionality, along the lines of one of the distinctiveness claims surveyed 
in §2.3. " en, it is argued that the distinctive feature of phenomenal inten-
tionality is mandatory in the basic kind of intentionality (the underived 
kind, the occurrently underived kind, or the not-merely-relationally 
underived kind). It is then concluded that only phenomenal intentional-
ity is basic. " us a schema for an argument for the primacy of phenomenal 
intentionality emerges: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality has feature F; 2) 
Only intentionality with feature F is basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal 
 intentionality is basic. 
 An argument from  Determinate Content fi tting this schema would proceed as 
follows: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality has non-derivatively determinate 
content; 2) Only intentionality with non-derivatively determinate content is 
basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentionality is basic. " is is probably 
the most common type of argument for the basicness of phenomenal inten-
tionality one fi nds in the relevant literature (see Loar 1987, 1995, Searle 1992, 
Horgan and Tienson 2002, Strawson 2008, Georgalis 2006, and Horgan and 
Graham forthcoming). " e central claim of Loar’s argument, for instance, is 
that non-phenomenal states, left to their own devices, so to speak, would be 
referentially inscrutable—there would be nothing to make them about rab-
bits, say, rather than undetached rabbit parts (see especially Loar 1995). Only 
phenomenally intentional states are referentially “scrutable” (if you will) in 
and of themselves: there is something about their phenomenal character that 
makes them about rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts. Yet we must 
suppose that intentional content is always determinate, hence “scrutable.” So 
non-phenomenally intentional states must derive their determinate content 
(or derive the determinacy of their content) from phenomenally intentional 
states. 24 Searle (1992) also appeals to content (in)determinacy in his argumen-
tation, though of a diff erent type. For Searle, the threat is that intentional con-
tent turn out to be indeterminate between diff erent ways one and the same 
worldly target could be presented (e.g., Hesperus and Phosphorus). But the dis-
tinctive feature of phenomenal intentionality he appeals to is essentially the 
same “inherent determinacy” invoked by Loar. 25 
 Another type of argument fi tting the same schema starts from the premise 
of  Intrinsic Subjectivity (McGinn 1988, Kriegel 2003b, Georgalis 2006, Frey 
this volume). As McGinn puts it, phenomenal intentionality is Janus-faced: 
it has an outward-looking face, which has to do with what it presents, but 
also an inward-looking face, to do with who it presents it to. 26 " e thought, 
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presumably, is that such Janus-faced content, and the intrinsic subjectivity it 
bestows, are required for basic intentionality. If so, the fact that only phenom-
enal intentionality features it entails that only phenomenal intentionality is 
basic. Fitting this into the above schema, we obtain the following: 1) Only 
phenomenal intentionality is intrinsically subjective; 2) Only intrinsically 
subjective intentionality is basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentional-
ity is basic. 
 Interestingly, it is harder to identify in the literature a similar argument 
from  Narrowness . Perhaps this is because the starting point of such an argu-
ment would have to be the premise that mental states with basic intentional-
ity must have narrow content, and in the present philosophical climate, this 
would seem grossly question-begging. " is is an interesting predicament, given 
that it is precisely the internalist promise of phenomenal intentionality that 
attracts its proponents in the fi rst place. One argument that can be interpreted 
as revolving around narrow content appeals to the phenomenon of  intentional 
inexistence : the fact that every intentional state can occur in the absence of that 
which it is about. On one version of the argument (Kriegel 2007), it is claimed 
that only adverbially intentional states exhibit intentional inexistence in and of 
themselves, and then that only phenomenally intentional states are adverbial. 
An adverbial intentional state, being entirely non-relational, would clearly have 
narrow content, so this can be seen as an argument for a basicness thesis from 
a narrowness one. 
 Bourget (2010) offers an importantly different kind of argument. He 
claims that  holism about intentionality, according to which intentional 
contents are assigned in the first instance to networks of interrelated 
states rather than individual states, is true of non-phenomenally inten-
tional states but not of phenomenally intentional ones. In consequence, 
non-phenomenal states partially derive their intentional properties from 
other non-phenomenal states. By contrast, since holism is false of phe-
nomenally intentional states, the latter’s intentionality is underived: each 
phenomenally intentional state has its content irrespective of any relations 
to other states. Here the designated distinctive feature of phenomenal 
intentionality appears to be a sort of intentional  atomism , and the resulting 
argument takes the following form: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality is 
atomistic; 2) Only atomistic intentionality is basic; therefore, 3) Only phe-
nomenal intentionality is basic. 
 As stressed earlier, I am not concerned here with the persuasiveness of any 
of these arguments, nor for that matter with the plausibility of their conclu-
sions. 27 " e purpose of this section has been to review the kind of work that has 
already been done on the notion of phenomenal intentionality. " is work has 
focused on four main questions: concerning the existence, scope, distinctive-
ness, and basicness of phenomenal intentionality. 
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 3.  * e Structure of a General * eory 
of Intentionality 
 In this section I consider how a general theory of intentionality would look 
within PIRP. As we saw in §1, within NERP the general theory of intentional-
ity can be seen as involving two chapters: the theory of source intentionality 
and the theory of non-source intentionality. " e same general structure can 
be replicated within PIRP. Since within PIRP phenomenal intentionality is the 
source intentionality, within PIRP a general theory of intentionality would 
comprise two chapters, the theory of phenomenal intentionality and the the-
ory of non-phenomenal intentionality. 
 3.1.  * e * eory of Phenomenal Intentionality 
 Recall that according to PIRP, intentionality is injected into the world with the 
appearance of the right kind of phenomenal character. " e fundamental task of 
the theory of phenomenal intentionality is to identify the kind of phenomenal 
character whose appearance injects intentionality into the world. One way to 
think of the challenge is as seeking the phenomenological signature of direct-
edness (Kriegel 2011 Ch.3). In the nature of things, it would have to be a very 
subtle phenomenal feature, one that may well be introspectively unimposing 
but quite pervasive in our stream of consciousness. 28 
 One suggestion might be culled from Strawson (2008). As noted in §2.3, 
like others Strawson maintains that, distinctively, phenomenal intentionality 
has determinate content in and of itself. But unlike others, he makes a pro-
posal about what it is that  endows phenomenal intentionality with this content 
determinacy: it is the phenomenology of  taking . " e notion of “taking” is pres-
ent already in Chisholm (1957), for whom the act through which the mind  takes 
something to be thus-and-so is the fundamental intentional act, with other 
intentional states being elaborations or modifi cations of a core act of taking. For 
Strawson, taking is a component or aspect of cognitive phenomenology. " ere 
is a subtle phenomenological feature, cognitive rather than sensory in nature, 
whereby a conscious experience takes something to be thus-and-so. 29 " is  phe-
nomenal taking , as we might call it, determines the exact intentional content of 
a phenomenally intentional state. Every phenomenally intentional state has a 
phenomenal character that involves phenomenal taking as a component, and it 
is in virtue of this phenomenal taking that the state is intentional. 
 A diff erent suggestion is due to Masrour (2008), who claims that it is only 
when a conscious experience exhibits a structural phenomenal feature he calls 
“objectual unity structure” (OUS) that it becomes intentional. Two phenom-
enal items are objectually unifi ed in a perceptual experience, according to 
Masrour, just in case the experience presents them as belonging to the same 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/12/12, NEWGEN
01_Kriegel_Ch01.indd   17 10/12/2012   9:18:54 PM
p h e n o m e n a l  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y18
object. Consider R. C. James’s famous Gestalt-switch-provoking picture of 
the Dalmatian (reproduced, e.g., in Marr 1982). Once the switch occurs and 
the Dalmatian is “seen,” certain black spots in one’s visual experience become 
objectually unifi ed while other spots are not so unifi ed. " e sensory aspect of 
the experience is the same before and after the switch, but after the switch the 
experience also exhibits a richer objectual-unity structure than before; it is 
only then that its phenomenal character intentionally represents a dog. 30 
 I have considered two possible subtle phenomenal features that may serve 
as the “intentional spark”—the kind of phenomenal feature whose appearance 
injects intentionality into the world. Interestingly, it is often thought that  all 
phenomenal character is intentional. If that is the case, and phenomenal tak-
ing or OUS is indeed the intentional spark, then it follows that phenomenal 
taking or OUS is a component in  every phenomenal character, that is, that all 
phenomenal character involves taking or OUS. 
 But the view that all phenomenal character is intentional may also suggest 
a third and competing account of the subtle phenomenal feature that brings 
intentionality into the world. " is is the suggestion that the relevant feature 
is phenomenality itself. By “phenomenality itself” I simply mean the most gen-
eral phenomenal genus, that of which all others are species (or perhaps the 
phenomenal determinable of which every other phenomenal property is a 
determinate). On this view, the intentional spark is  generic phenomenality . 
 Philosophers attracted to the idea that all phenomenality is intentional 
are often motivated by the claim that phenomenal character is diaphanous or 
transparent: when one introspects one’s current conscious experience, one is 
only aware of what the experience represents (Harman 1990). So a fourth sug-
gestion could be that transparency is the intentionality-injecting phenomenal 
feature. 31 " is suggestion would be coextensive with the last one if indeed all 
phenomenality is intentional. But it may be that not all phenomenality is inten-
tional. " us, it is sometimes held that while the transparency of experience is 
plausible for perceptual phenomenology (and certainly cognitive phenomenol-
ogy), it is quite less plausible for somatic and emotional phenomenology. 32 If this 
is the case, then the transparency suggestion and the generic-phenomenality 
suggestion would not coextend after all. 
 Of course, another option always available is to hold that the phenomeno-
logical signature of directedness is a  sui generis phenomenal feature, inexpli-
cable in terms of any other, simpler phenomenology. " e view would be that 
the feature is exhibited by some mental states, such that when (and only when) 
it is exhibited, the relevant states are endowed with source intentionality. 33 We 
may call this feature  sui generis phenomenal directedness . 34 
 I have considered fi ve options for identifying the phenomenal features 
that inject intentionality into the world: phenomenal taking, unity structure, 
generic phenomenality, transparency, and  sui generis phenomenal directedness. 
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" ere are certainly other options worth exploring. 35 " e theory of phenomenal 
intentionality would attend to all those options—and to the reasons for prefer-
ring one over others. 
 Also within the province of the theory of phenomenal intentionality would be 
work on the scope and distinctiveness of phenomenal intentionality, reviewed in 
§2.3 and §2.4. In addition, the theory of phenomenal intentionality would ulti-
mately consider contingent properties of phenomenal intentionality that are not 
necessarily distinctive or special but do matter to its intentional function. For 
example, I suspect that in phenomenal intentionality the referential connection 
to the world works roughly as suggested in the descriptive theory of linguistic 
reference, rather than as suggested by direct-reference theories. If this is right, 
this would be of central importance to the theory of phenomenal intentionality, 
even if it does not constitute a distinctive feature of phenomenal intentionality. 
 3.2.  * e * eory of Non-Phenomenal Intentionality 
 A comprehensive theory of intentionality would require not only an account of 
the phenomenal character that serves as the source of intentionality but also 
an account of how that phenomenal character  outsources intentionality. " at 
is, a full understanding of source intentionality does not constitute an under-
standing of intentionality as such. " e other chapter of the (PIRP-ly) theory 
of intentionality concerns the nature of non-phenomenal intentionality and 
how it is grounded in phenomenal intentionality. Surprisingly, perhaps, several 
options for such an account can already be found in the existing literature (see 
Kriegel 2011 Ch.4 for review and discussion). 36 
 One account, due to Searle (1992), may be called  potentialism . Recall that 
according to Searle, non-phenomenally intentional states are intentional 
in virtue of being  potentially phenomenal. " us, an unconscious belief that 
 p has  p as its content in virtue of the fact that if it  were conscious it would 
have the phenomenal-intentional content that  p . At the same time, linguistic 
expressions, pictures, and so on, are surely not even potentially conscious. So 
their intentionality must be grounded in mental intentionality in some other 
way, perhaps through the Gricean mechanism of intention-based semantics 
(see Grice 1957). We may thus propose that Searle’s overall account of how 
non-phenomenal intentionality is grounded in phenomenal intentionality pro-
ceeds in two phases: the fi rst extends intentionality from the narrow base of 
phenomenally intentional states to the realm of non-phenomenal mentality 
via counterfactuals about merely potential phenomenal character; the second 
extends it from the mental realm to the realm of non-mental intentionality via 
the right kind of speaker intentions. 37 
 A second account may be called  inferentialism (Loar 2003, Horgan and 
Graham forthcoming). On this view, non-phenomenally intentional states 
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inherit their intentionality through inferential connections they bear to phe-
nomenally intentional states within the overall cognitive architecture of the 
mind. " us, an unconscious belief that  p is assigned just this content because it 
interacts with a conscious belief that  p → q to bring about a conscious belief that 
 q . Again, because non-mental items are not inferentially connected to mental 
ones, this would require supplementation in the form of an account of how 
non-mental intentionality is grounded in mental intentionality. 
 A third account may be called  interpretivism (Kriegel 2011 Ch.4). " is view 
proposes a unifi ed account of non-mental and mental non-phenomenal inten-
tionality according to which all such intentionality is bestowed by phenom-
enally conscious interpretation. For example, an unconscious belief that  p has 
 p as its content in virtue of the fact that the best (conscious) interpretation of 
the system whose state it is would assign to the system a belief that  p ; and ditto 
for any linguistic expression or picture with the content that  p . 
 Of course, there is also a fourth option, which is to deny the existence 
of non-phenomenal intentionality altogether; we may call it  eliminativism 
(Georgalis 2006, Strawson 2008). 38 On this view, there is no problem of ground-
ing non-phenomenal intentionality in phenomenal intentionality, because the 
former does not exist. " us a full account of phenomenal intentionality, per-
haps along the lines of one of the options mentioned in §3.1, would constitute 
a comprehensive theory of intentionality. 
 As before, I am not concerned here with how plausible these accounts are; 
their portraits given here are too summary to allow serious discussion of their 
merits anyway. My discussion here serves only to point out some available 
options for accounting for non-phenomenal intentionality. In diff erent combi-
nations with the accounts of phenomenal intentionality covered in §3.1, they 
would constitute diff erent comprehensive theories of intentionality. For exam-
ple, one comprehensive theory might combine the phenomenal-taking view of 
phenomenal intentionality with potentialism about non-phenomenal inten-
tionality; another the  sui generis phenomenal directedness view with inferen-
tialism about non-phenomenal intentionality; yet another the transparency 
view of phenomenal intentionality with interpretivism about non-phenomenal 
intentionality; and so on. Some combinations may be somehow more natural 
than others, but all would appear coherent and thus antecedently viable as 
comprehensive theories of intentionality in the PIRP genre. 
 Conclusion 
 Work on intentionality within analytic philosophy of mind has been domi-
nated for the past four decades by the idea that intentionality comes into the 
world when a certain type of tracking relation appears. In the last decade or so, 
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however, another approach has been gaining momentum, suggesting that it is 
rather the appearance of a certain type of phenomenal character that injects 
intentionality into the world. From and around this newer approach a clus-
ter of observations, contentions, and debates has emerged that has enlivened 
philosophical discussions of the mind, prompting philosophers to take a fresh 
look at the phenomenon of intentionality. " e claim I have been making in this 
chapter is that the work pertaining to the cluster is ready to be consolidated 
into a well-defi ned, clearly organized, self-conscious research program. 39 
 Notes 
 1 .  First accounts in this vein, such as Dennis Stampe’s (1977) and Fred Dretske’s (1981), 
were focused on broadly causal or informational relations. Under the infl uence of Ruth 
Millikan (1984, 1989, 1993) and David Papineau (1984, 1993), many philosophers have 
incorporated a teleological aspect into their account of the relevant relation (see Dretske 
1988, McGinn 1989, Neander 1995). 
 2 .  I cannot make the case for this claim here, but my suspicion that it is only phenomenal 
intentionality which is concerned in those debates arises from the fact that unconscious 
mental states were not widely recognized before Freud’s work on repression and the 
postulation in cognitive science of myriad sub-personal unconscious states. Brentano 
(1874) himself argued explicitly for the co-extension of the mental, the conscious, and 
the intentional. So it is only natural to interpret him, and hence his students, as con-
cerned with phenomenal intentionality. " ere is interesting historical research to be 
done here. 
 3 .  I am assuming here that linguistic intentionality is derived. Some proponents of NERP 
disagree (e.g., Millikan 1984), arguing [that the tracking property in virtue of which 
mental states represent non-derivatively is exhibited by linguistic expressions as well.] 
 4 .  " ere is a limit-case version of NERP, too. According to Dennett (1990),  all intentionality 
is derived (none is underived), so in general the intentionality of derivatively intentional 
states must derive from each other’s, without being ultimately grounded in underived 
intentionality. 
 5 .  In principle, the second chapter could be exactly the same in a NERP-ly theory and a 
PIRP-ly theory. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that the derivation relation 
cannot be thought of in the same way by both. However, the nature of the sources of deri-
vation is likely to constrain theorizing about the nature of the derivation, so the radical 
diff erence between the sources might very well lead to very diff erent accounts of derived 
intentionality. 
 6 .  I am indebted to Terry Horgan for this distinction. 
 7 .  One limit-case epistemic possibility is that there is not really any spread at all, because 
the only intentionality there is is the intentionality of phenomenal consciousness itself 
(more on this in 2.4). 
 8 .  I will off er some remarks in the present section about diff erent ways of potentially cash-
ing out the theses as vaguely and generically stated, but more will be said on such matters 
in §2. 
 9 .  I am indebted to Terry Horgan for this formulation. 
 10 .  Some of these matters will be further pursued later in the chapter. 
 11 .  " is issue can get complicated by matters terminological. Some, like Georgalis (2006), 
reserve “phenomenal” for the sensory kind of what-it’s-like-ness (more or less stipula-
tively), while yet recognizing the what-it’s-like-ness of thought. " is looks to be probably 
just a verbal disagreement with those who claim there is a phenomenology of thought. 
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 12 .  " is is the metaphysical picture of phenomenal consciousness embraced by Chalmers (1996), 
as I understand him. Chalmers holds that phenomenal properties supervene on physicalis-
tically naturalizable ones with  nomological necessity, and that the pertinent supervenience 
laws are ontologically brute. He also regards his metaphysical picture as a form of natural-
ism about phenomenal consciousness, but not as a physicalistic version of naturalism. For 
clearer examples of naturalistic PIRP, see McGinn 1988 and Kriegel 2011 Ch.2. 
 13 .  Horgan and Tienson’s (2002) descriptions of certain conscious episodes can be seen as 
attempting to tap into an idea of this sort. 
 14 .  " e present use of “sensory” and “non-sensory” pertains, in eff ect by stipulation, to rela-
tively raw aspects of one’s sense-induced experience. It is a non-trivial matter to get a 
more formal specifi cation of these terms going. 
 15 .  What that feature  is is elucidated in terms of paradigmatic examples, which Masrour 
describes in detail but which I will not reproduce here. 
 16 .  Weaker theses might suggest that there is an individuative but non-proprietary cognitive 
phenomenology (say, because every belief is accompanied by imagery, and the imagery 
varies with the belief ’s content); or that there is a proprietary but non-individuative phe-
nomenology (say, because although beliefs in general are phenomenally diff erent from 
hopes, suppositions, and other propositional attitudes, it is not the case that a belief that 
 p is phenomenally diff erent from a belief that  q for any  p and  q ). 
 17 .  For other arguments of this form, see Peacocke 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Kriegel 
2003a, and Pitt 2004. 
 18 .  Diff erent authors have focused on diff erent types of threat to content determinacy. 
Searle (1992) focuses on the threat to the intensionality of content; Loar (1995), 
Georgalis (2006), and Horgan and Graham (forthcoming) on the Quinean threat of ref-
erential inscrutability; Strawson (2008) on the threat once referred to as the “horizontal 
disjunction problem,” the thought that tracking theories of content cannot discriminate 
between diff erent links in a causal chain leading up to an intentional state. 
 19 .  Here as elsewhere, there are diffi  cult questions surrounding the explication of intrin-
sicality. " e relevant notion for our present purposes is that of a state instantiating a 
certain property not in virtue of standing in a relation to some other state, but in and of 
itself. 
 20 .  For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Kriegel forthcoming. 
 21 .  An exception is McGinn (1988), who argues that conscious intentionality is wide, and 
its being both wide and in some way present to the subject is part of what makes it so 
mysterious. 
 22 .  As mentioned in a previous note, Georgalis would not state the thesis this way but would 
probably subscribe to it as interpreted by us. Perhaps it is also worth noting that Strawson 
does not use the term “phenomenal intentionality” but instead the term “experiential 
intentionality.” " is is potentially better in avoiding confusion with the more sensory 
reading of the term “phenomenal.” 
 23 .  An even weaker thesis would require non-experiential intentional states to bear the 
requisite relations not necessarily to phenomenal-intentional states but also possibly to 
 merely potentially phenomenal-intentional states. I am not familiar with any defense, nor 
defender, of this latter claim. 
 24 .  " e argument thus proceeds as follows: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality has inher-
ently scrutable content; 2) Only intentionality with inherently scrutable content is basic; 
therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentionality is basic. Essentially the same argument 
for the special status of phenomenal intentionality is presented by Horgan and Graham 
(forthcoming), who develop the argument quite a bit further. 
 25 .  " is kind of fi ned-grained content is what Searle (1992) refers to as “aspectual shape.” 
His argument could thus be construed as follows: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality is 
non-derivatively aspectually shaped; 2) Only non-derivatively aspectually shaped inten-
tionality is basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentionality is basic. 
 26 .  Similarly, Georgalis (2006) insists that only conscious intentionality involves essentially 
not only the two-place relation  x represents y but also the three-place relation  x represents 
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y to z . However, Georgalis argues that there is an important diff erence between phenom-
enal and conscious intentionality and does not make the same claim about phenomenal 
intentionality. 
 27 .  One objection, due to Shani (2008), is that although proponents of phenomenal inten-
tionality (most notably Loar and Georgalis) are right that a full theory of intentionality 
must incorporate a certain fi rst-person notion, there are ways to do so without appeal-
ing to phenomenal intentionality. In particular, Shani argues that the central aspect of 
fi rst-person intentionality would be a notion of idiosyncratic perspective, but such a 
perspective can be accounted for in naturalistic, indeed broadly teleological, terms that 
appeal solely to unconscious and non-phenomenal phenomena. 
 28 .  " ese two may not be unrelated: the most pervasive features of phenomenology are often 
hardest to spot, because hardest to isolate (there may be no vivid contrasts between pres-
ence and absence). 
 29 .  Note that if taking is a cognitive phenomenal feature, and is necessary for phenomenal 
intentionality, then all phenomenal intentionality is cognitive, at least in the sense that 
phenomenal character must have at least one cognitive element in order to be inten-
tional. " is may raise the objection that certain animals and neonates may be robbed 
of intentionality. " ere are probably reasonable responses to this objection, but a full 
discussion would take us too far afi eld. (Moreover, some of the moves here would parallel 
relatively familiar moves from discussions in the theory of animal consciousness and the 
problem it presents for higher-order thought theories.) 
 30 .  " e pre-switch visual experience is already intentional: it represents an externally situ-
ated pattern of black and white splotches. Still, it may be that there must be  some unity 
structure present in order for the visual phenomenology to become intentional. It may 
be, too, that virtually all visual phenomenology already has some unity structure and is 
already intentional. 
 31 .  " is requires that we think of transparency as a positive phenomenal feature, exhibited 
by some (or all) experiences, rather than as the  absence of certain phenomenal features, 
as it sometimes is. 
 32 .  " is is not to say that the transparency thesis has not been defended for such experi-
ences as well (Shoemaker 1994, Tye 2000). But it is roundly accepted that such defenses 
tend to be more theoretical and rely less on the immediate intuitive conviction that the 
thesis enjoys in the perceptual domain. 
 33 .  It would be a substantive question at this point whether all phenomenal states have 
this phenomenal feature. (It is, of course, coherent to hold either that only some do or 
that all do.) Which way one goes on this question will then have implications for any 
possible coextension between the present suggestion and the generic-phenomenality 
suggestion. 
 34 .  Methodologically, it is probably preferable to seek a more explanatory account of the 
kind of phenomenal character we are seeking and settle for an account of it in terms of 
 sui generis phenomenal directedness only as a last resort. 
 35 .  See Kriegel 2011 Ch.3 for discussion of two more suggestions, one of which is developed 
from Frey’s (this volume) discussion. 
 36 .  Gricean intention-based semantics, although the leading approach within NERP, can-
not be straightforwardly applied within PIRP because the relevant intentions Grice iden-
tifi es are presumably unconscious. It is very possible, however, to divide the theory of 
derived intentionality within PIRP into two parts, the fi rst concerned with the deriva-
tion of non-mental intentionality from non-phenomenal mental intentionality via the 
Gricean mechanism and the second concerned with the derivation of non-phenomenal 
mental intentionality from phenomenal intentionality via some other mechanism. (For 
more discussion, see Kriegel 2011.) 
 37 .  Note that these intentions, at least those proposed by Grice, are typically unconscious. 
So the derivation of linguistic intentionality from conscious intentionality would have to 
proceed in two steps: it would not be possible for the former to derive directly from the 
latter. 
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 38 .  It is also possible to interpret Georgalis (2006) and Pitt (Ms) as holding this position. 
Georgalis maintains that there is no unconscious intentionality, and although he allows 
that some conscious intentionality is non-phenomenal, this is mainly because, as 
remarked earlier, his notion of phenomenality is narrower and applies only to sensory 
quality. Pitt, by contrast, allows that there is unconscious intentionality but proposes that 
such intentionality is constituted by an  unconscious phenomenality . " us although there is 
such a thing as unconscious intentionality, there is no non-phenomenal intentionality. 
 39 .  For comments on a previous draft, I would like to thank Ben Blumson, Curtis Brown, 
Tamar Szab ó Gendler, Kristin Hurlburt, Adam Pautz, Galen Strawson, and especially 
Brie Gertler and Susanna Siegel. 
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